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Abstract 
Brecht used the term "gest" to describe the generic components of human social behavior. He schooled 
actors in "decomposing" real conduct into distinct gestic images, which were criticized, compared, and 
altered by other actor-spectators. In his pedagogic theater, Brecht's young players engaged in a reciprocal 
process of acting and observing, which prepared them to act critically outside the theater. This gestic 
reciprocality echoes the master-slave dialectic in Hegel's Phenomenology and Lacan's description of the 
mirror phase. In Hegel, a subject achieves mastery (or self-consciousness) through the recognition of 
another subject. In Lacan, the infant recognizes itself in an (alienated) mirror-image and in its dramatic 
interactions with other infants. In each of these inter-subjective dialectics, the subject achieves 
sovereignty through the recognition of others and through a dramatic exchange with others. For Brecht, 
however, the structural roles of actor and spectator, teacher and student, were reversible, thus yielding a 
utopian notion of shared or collective sovereignty that is absent from Lacan. Furthermore, Brecht hoped 
that the sovereignty gained in the gestic theater would be transferred to actions outside the theater, on 
the stage of history. 
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BRECHT, HEGEL, LACAN: BRECHT'S THEORY 
OF GEST AND THE PROBLEM OF THE 
SUBJECT 
PHILIP E. BISHOP 
Edison Community College 
Brecht's theory of gestic acting has been neglected in favor of the 
more widely known "alienation effect." But the gest merits con- 
sideration in its own right for at least three reasons. First, it is in some 
ways a rudimentary preparation for the more carefully conceived and 
more systematically presented theory of alienation, which receives its 
most unified exposition in The Short Organum for the Theater 
(1947). The theory of gest is thus an important element in Brecht's 
development as a dramatic theorist, a topic explored by Reiner 
Steinweg. Second, the theory of gest was devised during Brecht's 
work with amateur and student actors in his learning theater, and so 
belongs to the period of Brecht's most intense political activism and 
dramatic experimentation. As a corollary to the learning plays and 
Brecht's pedagogic theories, the theory of gest supported Brecht's 
most concerted effort to supersede the habits and forms of the tradi- 
tional theater. It is thus part of a minor but important chapter in the 
history of the modern theater, one of the curiosities of radical political 
culture of the Weimar Republic.' 
Finally, the theory of gest is an examination of the dramatic 
spectacle as a means of human interaction and communication. In 
particular it asks how the theater-as an arena for such interaction- 
may contribute to the formation of active, critical adults. In this light 
Brecht's theory of gest is revealed as an inquiry into the composition 
of human subjectivity or, as we shall see, inter-subjectivity. And it is 
on this last count that I examine here Brecht's comments on gest and 
compare his theory to Hegel's and Jacques Lacan's accounts of 
human inter-subjectivity. This comparison aims not so much to judge 
the merits of Brecht's theory as philosophical discourse, but rather to 
evaluate its significance for a much broader philosophical project, 
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what can be called the "problem of the subject."' This theoretical 
problem has been addressed in this century as often by other 
disciplines-psychoanalysis, psychology, literary criticism-as by 
philosophy per se. Brecht's theory of gest has special interest in this 
context because it was also an intervention, on aesthetic grounds, into 
the social process by which humans become subjects. 
I. Brecht's Theory of Gest 
Brecht's first use of the term Gestus, or gest, appears around 
1929 as a rather inexact description for the basic components of 
social behavior. It denoted for him "the realm of attitudes adopted by 
the characters towards one another. . . . Physical attitude, tone of 
voice and facial expression all are determined by a social gest" 
(Theatre 198). It described such generic social actions as wrinkling 
one's brow, and the way that such actions were demonstrated by 
actors on the stage. Gests were the foundation of the theatrics of daily 
life, but they were exposed most readily to our perception by actors on 
a stage. Brecht used the term gest most frequently in his work with 
amateur actors and the learning theater, during the years 1929-33. 
Later, the term was used as an adjunct to the more famous "aliena- 
tion," although even in his Short Organum for the Theater Brecht 
reserved a somewhat particular meaning for gest.' The term also 
appears in Brecht's essays on poetic language and music, but there too 
it is an essentially dramatic concept: "A musical or literary phrase 
must act out the emphatic gesture that it describes, as in the Biblical 
maxim 'If thine eye offends thee, pluck it out!' " ( Theatre 117). The 
application of the gestic method was a means of analyzing ordinary 
social actions. Brecht thought that seeing social action as theatrical, 
as one dramatic "hypothesis" among many alternatives, would give 
his actors a greater command over their actions outside the theater. 
The actor, whether professional or amateur, could experiment by 
substituting one gest for another and thus throwing into question the 
necessity of certain actions under certain circumstances. Brecht 
comments in the Organum: "[The actor] has again and again to make 
what one might call hypothetical adjustments to our structure, by 
mentally switching off the motive forces of our society or by 
substituting others for them; a process which leads real conduct to 
acquire an element of 'unnaturalness,' thus allowing the real motive 
forces to be shorn of their naturalness and become capable of 2




manipulation" (Theatre 191). By distinguishing between the 
"hypothetical" actions of the stage and "real conduct" of human life, 
Brecht hoped to train the actor (and the spectator) to act in both 
realms. In the fictive realm of the stage, one action (or gest) could be 
imaginatively substituted for another and the results tested for their 
efficacy in hypothetical situations. Such substitutions fostered the 
sense that the dramatic action was removed from the real and hence, 
in Brecht's word, "unnatural." But, Brecht reasoned, the conscious 
substitution of one action for another in the theater should also 
encourage the belief that all human behavior was "hypothetical" - 
that everyone was always acting a part. 
The first postulate of Brecht's theory of gest was this 
fundamental equivalence of theatrical action and "real conduct." 
Brecht defined the gest as a generic action or attitude which people 
commonly adopt toward one another and which is chiefly motivated 
by habit or custom. Gests were things that everyone did: furrowing 
one's brow in thought, cooing over a baby in a crib-in general, things 
done habitually or compulsively. In Brecht's words, the gest was a 
"complex of gestures, mimicry, and customary manners which refer 
one or more persons to one or more [other] persons" ( Werke 15: 409). 
People drew on a stock of such gestures and mannerisms in their daily 
intercourse with others. Gests had well-established social meanings 
and often were proven ways of eliciting certain responses from others 
(a smile from an infant, for example). The audiences for such gests 
had seen them before and recognized them as acts with conven- 
tionalized meanings. In this sense gests constituted a genuine 
language, a medium for the communication of social meanings. 
Brecht intended for gestic acting to make these dramatic attitudes 
(Haltungen) perceptible both to the actor who adopted them and to 
the spectators who witnessed them. Brecht cited the example of a fish 
peddlar who acts out a "selling gest": the enticing tone of voice, the 
hand movements, the body leaned forward toward a reluctant 
customer, all of which a peddlar must constantly manipulate if he or 
she wants to make a living. The peddlar's gest was an art born of 
necessity-the same necessity that would probably compel a 
youngster to master the same basic gest in hawking newspapers. 
Brecht encouraged his actors to adopt such attitudes 
"hypothetically," to shed the compulsion of necessity, and to create a 
dramatic catalogue of such generic human attitudes. Freed from the 
exigencies of real life, the theatrical gest of selling could be 3
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interchanged with that of, say, "buying" or "washing one's hands." 
Brecht was especially fond of applying a familiar gest to an 
extraordinary situation: for example, purchasing an elephant with the 
same aplomb as one pinches a head of cabbage. The purpose of gestic 
acting was not only to clarify such basic gests (Grundgestus) but also 
to establish a basic dramatic vocabulary that an actor could inten- 
tionalize as easily as the words in a speech. 
Brecht realized that, in drawing attention to the gestic substratum 
of a play's action, gestic acting was bound to affect the coherence and 
continuity of the fictive plot. This problem was not so acute so long as 
the gestic method was applied to plays for amateurs, to be acted in 
schools and factories. But the method's disruptive effect upon tradi- 
tional dramatic values was evident in Brecht's first attempt to 
introduce gestic acting onto the commercial stage, in the 1931 
production of Mann ist Mann. This was a grotesquely staged 
commentary on mass society, featuring actors on stilts towering over 
the diminutive Peter Lorre, in the leading role of Galy Gay. Brecht 
had schooled Lorre in the gestic method and encouraged the cast to 
decide for themselves which were the decisive gests and how they 
should be emphasized to the audience. 
The result was controversial in the extreme. Brecht had to defend 
Lorre's technique in a public letter, in which he proposed new, gestic 
criteria for judging an actor's performance. The playwright argued 
that a play must be "decomposed" into its gestic components, as if 
gests were the dramatic molecules from which the entire play was 
compounded. This decomposition required the subordination of 
certain speeches so as to attain the necessary gestic emphasis. Brecht 
admitted that Lorre's declamation of speeches in the play's second 
part "seemed monotonous and to hamper the sense," because they 
were so obviously decomposed into gests. But, the author pleaded, the 
audience should recognize the net gain in sacrificing individual 
sentences: "For over and above the meaning of the individual 
sentences a quite specific basic gest was being brought out here which 
admittedly depended on knowing what the individual sentences meant 
but at the same time used this meaning only as a means to an end" 
(Theatre 54). 
To put it another way, the acting italicized certain moments in the 
play, leaving others to be regarded with less attention. Such italicizing 
was achieved by an agreement among the actors and playwright as to 
which were in fact the crucial gests. For example, Brecht recounted 4




the debate concerning when Lorre's face should by whitened by chalk, 
signifying the moment of Galy Gay's greatest fear: 
The character's development has been very carefully divided 
into 
four phases, for which four masks are employed-the packer's 
face, up to the trial; the "natural" face, up to his awakening after 
being shot; the "blank page," up to his reassembly after the 
funeral speech; finally the soldier's face. To give some idea of our 
way of working: opinions differed as to which phase, second or 
third, called for the face to be whitened. After long con- 
sideration, Lorre plumped for the third, as being characterized, to 
his mind, by "the biggest decision and the biggest strain." 
Between fear of death and fear of life he chose to treat the latter as 
the more profound. (Theatre 55-56) 
Brecht admitted that such divisions might create the appearance of an 
actor who could not sustain a character's development throughout the 
play, who was a "short-range episodist." The sacrifice of certain 
continuities in both character and plot was necessary, however, if the 
epic actor was "to make particular incidents between human beings 
seem striking (to use human beings as a setting)" (56). Brecht hoped, 
on the one hand, that his audience would conclude that the distinct ac- 
tions from which a character was built-"this way of joining up," 
"this way of selling an elephant," "this way of conducting the case" - 
might just as well be recombined or altered to produce a different 
character. On the other hand, Brecht expected his audience to 
recognize when the same gest was applied to different situations. He 
asked, "How many spectators can so far discard the need for tension 
as to see how, with this new sort of actor, the same gesture is used to 
summon him to the wall to change his clothes as is subsequently used 
to summon him there in order to be shot, and realize that the situation 
is similar but the behaviour different?" (56). 
From Brecht's own comments it is apparent that his audience 
was reluctant to comply. The gestic method demanded of an audience 
a special kind of visual attention to the action on stage: not only in 
following the sequential actions of the plot but also in fixing on certain 
actions as separate from the fictional story. Few audiences were up to 
the task, and Brecht repeatedly found himself advising audiences on 
how to watch his gestic action. He often had recourse to film as a 5
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metaphor for observing the gest. In the letter on Mann ist Mann, 
Brecht noted that they "made a film of the performance, concentrating 
on the principal nodal points of the action and cutting it so as to bring 
out the gests in a very abbreviated way, and this most interesting expe- 
riment shows surprisingly well how exactly Lorre manages in these 
long speeches to mime the basic meaning underlying every (inaudible) 
sentence" (Theatre 55). A note from the Messingkauf Brecht's 
unfinished theoretical dialogue, offers another example of the film 
metaphor. After filming Helene Weigel during rehearsal, Brecht 
claimed that each frame revealed an entire gest. "Every frame 
[Bildchen] showed a complete expression," he wrote, "complete in 
itself and with its own meaning" ( Werke 16: 606). 
The criteria for judging a gestic performance required the 
audience to watch a performance by mentally filming the action and 
snipping apart the frames, revealing the partial images from which the 
whole visual experience was composed. But these gestic images were 
not only the discrete parts of the dramatic action. They were also 
dramatic copies of "real conduct," trivial actions normally witnessed 
uncritically in daily life but exposed by the performance as poses. In 
this way, Brecht demanded that his audiences see "double." The 
audience needed to see each gestic element in its fictive function, as a 
part of the play's plot, and in its mimetic function, as a semblance of 
some ordinary act commonly witnessed in daily life. It is small 
wonder that Brecht found few audiences to match his expectations. 
Yet only by such a relentlessly analytic approach could the 
lexicon of social gests be exposed, for Brecht was primarily interested 
in social gests, actions that revealed something about social rela- 
tions. In a comment on gestic music, he noted that "the attitude of 
chasing away a fly is not yet a social gest, though the attitude of 
chasing away a dog may be one; for instance, if it comes to represent a 
badly dressed man's continual battle against watchdogs." Certain 
other kinds of gest are always social, for example the gests of labor, 
because "all human activity directed towards the mastery of nature is 
a social undertaking, an undertaking between humans" (Theatre 
104). But the gest was social in another respect. Because it had to be 
witnessed by others, the gest defined an axis of social communica- 
tion. Gests were actions addressed toward other human beings, 
performed in front of them, and eliciting a response in turn from that 
audience. In this dialectic of display and recognition, wrote Brecht, 
"characters are created out of the knowledge of their behavior to other 
people" ( Werke 15: 408). 6




In other words, gestic action required gestic interaction. Brecht 
offered a striking example of this interaction in a comment on his 
collaboration with the British actor Charles Laughton. The two were 
translating the German text of Galileo into English, even though 
Brecht spoke poor English and Laughton spoke no German at all. 
Under these circumstances the translation was, we might expect, an 
enterprise fraught with difficulty from the very beginning. But the two 
devised a working method that sacrificed literary nuance in favor of 
dramatic essentials. According to Brecht, "we had to decide the gest 
of each piece of dialogue by my acting it all in bad English or even in 
German and his then acting it back in proper English in a variety of 
ways until I could say: that's it" (Theatre 165). Failing to achieve an 
understanding in words, the two fell back on that dramatic attitude 
which Brecht believed was also the foundation of poetic speech-the 
gest: "We were forced to do what better equipped translators should 
do too: to translate gests. For language is theatrical in so far as it 
primarily expresses the mutual attitude of the speakers" (165-66). 
This must have been one of the great unremembered scenes of the 
modern theater: the setting, Laughton's beach house; the players, the 
portly actor and the ascetic playwright; the script, this labored 
negotiation of lines, each actor alternately acting out a passage while 
the other watched with a critical acuity gained from years in the 
theater. The success of their efforts depended not only upon their 
ability to copy a gest in German with a gest in English, but also to alter 
what they had seen acted by the other until they both had arrived at the 
truest gest-when Brecht would have cried, "That's it!" 
This example shows how the gestic interaction establishes a 
reciprocality similar to that of speech. The poles of speech are rever- 
sible, as is evident in the ease with which the "I" of one speaker 
becomes the "you" of the second speaker.° In the gestic interaction 
exemplified by Brecht and Laughton, the actor and spectator alternate 
their roles, first observing the attitude of the other, criticizing its 
accuracy, and then proposing their own gestic hypothesis, which is 
observed and criticized in turn. Brecht described this as a process of 
testing actions on and through the other. Of the work with Laughton he 
wrote, "This system of performance-and-repetition had one immense 
advantage in that psychological discussions were almost entirely 
avoided. Even the most fundamental gests, such as Galileo's way of 
observing, or his showmanship, or his craze for pleasure, were 
established in three dimensions by actual performance" (165). The 
gestic performance was in fact a performance shared between two 7
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actor-spectators. The truth of the performance depended upon the 
critical attention with which the audience tested out the accuracy of 
the dramatic spectacle, and then were tested as actors in their own 
turn. 
Brecht lamented that audiences in the commercial theater-what 
he termed disdainfully the "culinary" theater-were especially ill- 
equipped to engage in the active reciprocality of gest. Partly for this 
reason perhaps, Brecht applied the gestic method primarily with 
amateur actors in productions of the learning plays, or Lehrstucke. 
The Lehrstiick rehearsals were often exercises in how to act, rather 
than how to act a particular script. Brecht was more interested in 
training young actors than in producing finished plays (which may 
account in part for the barrenness of the learning plays). From this 
context Brecht developed his concept of a pedagogic theater, which is 
a theoretical correlative to the gest and, some have argued, forms the 
conceptual basis of Brecht's later work (see Steinweg). 
The purpose of Brecht's pedagogic theater was both to train its 
amateur players in the lexicon of social action and to expose this 
lexicon to their critical scrutiny. In the workshop rehearsals, the 
gestures of daily life could be identified, examined, and 
"decomposed" into distinct attitudes, which were then subject to the 
critical eye of the entire group. Rehearsing was a matter of 
reassembling these attitudes and behaviors into consciously and 
intentionally acted types of social action. It was an inventive form of 
ethical and political training: "At the root of the learning play lies the 
expectation that the player can be socially influenced by carrying out 
certain ways of behaving, by assuming certain attitudes, reciting 
certain speeches, and so forth. In this way the emulation of highly 
qualifed exemplars plays an important role, as does the critique that is 
applied to such exemplars through intentionally playing them other- 
wise" ( Werke 17: 1024). Brecht expected his actors, as a first step, 
merely to copy others' actions, for only by copying a behavior could it 
be compared to other behaviors. The second step was to judge 
whether the behavior was effective, whether a different behavior 
might be substituted, or what other situation this behavior might be 
applied to. 
Brecht's attitude toward the "emulation" of exemplary actions 
and characters here qualifies his polemic against the "Aristotelian" 
theater, an issue too often clouded by Brecht's and others' modernist 
rhetoric. At its root, the gestic method was a mimesis, since a 8




theatrical gest was recognizable only through its imitation of real ac- 
tions. Aristotle asserted, of course, that all the arts operated by such a 
mimetic principle. Brecht did not repudiate this mimetic function of 
the dramatic image. Indeed, as I have noted, the fictive, mimetic 
qualities of theatrical action justified its sovereignty toward the reality 
that it copied. And, Brecht shared with Aristotle an interest in 
affecting the actions and character of real people, that is, in making 
people better. But this effect was executed much differently in 
Brecht's theory. Because the fictional actions of theater had been 
criticized and judged to be true, those copies deserved to be copied in 
turn by actors in the real world. In effect, Brecht reversed the mimetic 
axis by calling for real conduct to imitate the hypothetical conduct of 
the theater. 
This practical influence had, of course, a primary importance to 
Brecht. The practicality of the theater undergirded its political value. 
In the pedagogic theater, Brecht aimed to "influence" his young 
players socially and politically. Yet this aim was much more restricted 
than it might seem at first. Despite his Marxist aims, Brecht's gestic 
theater was not a form of agitprop or political propaganda per se. It 
was rather a kind of moral education with a political undertone (hence 
the moralism of learning plays like the Jasager and the Neinsager). 
Moreover, a play's pedagogic purpose might not be evident in the 
dramatic performance. In this case, the play was not the thing. 
Pedagogic success or failure was judged by the critical process which 
led up to a performance and which schooled the actors in critical ac- 
tion. 
It is too often thought that Brecht tried to destroy the boundary 
between art and actuality, to remove the "illusion" from the Illu- 
sionstheater. In fact the gestic method merely made the boundary 
between art and reality more passable. The pedagogic theater 
schooled its players in the passage from the fictions of art to the real 
conduct of daily life. Hence the ambivalence of the gestic spectator 
before the dramatic image: it was an action to be emulated at the same 
time as it was criticized. But this ambivalence seems to enhance the 
fictive (or illusionary) qualities of the dramatic action; indeed, the 
critical judgment of actions in the real world depended upon seeing 
them as fictional or artful. Only as a fictionalized gest could such ac- 
tions be subjected to the collective critical judgment of the pedagogic 
theater. Its players were constantly being asked to step across the 
threshold between fiction and actuality, and to evaluate the one in 9
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terms of the other. They had, as Brecht said later of Helene Weigel, 
"to sacrifice neither realism to the ideal image, nor the ideal image to 
realism" ( Werke 16: 609). 
The restricted function of the pedagogic theater applied to its 
audience as well. Brecht noted that the "learning play teaches by 
being played, not by being seen. In principle there need be no 
spectator for a learning play, though one can of course be used" 
(Werke 17: 1024). By ostensibly doing away with the audience, 
Brecht in fact had merely displaced the audience's function onto the 
players themselves. The players were each other's audience, a 
circumstance that surely reinforced the kind of collective 
reciprocality at work between Brecht and Laughton in translating 
Galileo. When the learning plays were performed in schools, Brecht 
urged his young audiences to judge the accuracy of the players' depic- 
tions and to imagine themselves in situations similar to those 
portrayed on stage. Clearly, Brecht's pedagogic theater did not block 
identification with the play's characters altogether (this in spite of the 
author's often intemperate attacks upon "Aristotelianism"); nor did it 
encourage an immediate "participation" of the audience in the play's 
action. Rather, the pedagogic theater sought to induce in its audience 
the imaginary anticipation of the moment in which they would 
become actors in turn. The best audience looked forward to the oppor- 
tunity to emulate the actions they saw depicted on stage and, wherever 
possible, to improve on those actions in their own conduct. The 
dramatic image posed by gestic acting was not merely the mediating 
point between actor and spectator; it became an ideal measure against 
which action in the real world could be gauged. The proof of the 
pedagogic pudding came when actors and audience both stepped back 
across the threshold from the theater into actuality. There the critical 
ambivalence of the gestic method was supposed to translate itself into 
a real conduct as malleable and intentionally chosen as the symbolic 
conduct on stage. 
II. The Dialectic of Sovereignty 
The purpose of the gest should now be clear. It was to foster in the 
participants of the theater a mastery over their own actions and hence 
a mastery over the world in which these actions occurred. Yet the 
pedagogic theater expected that everyone who entered it was in need 10




of education. And achieving mastery depended on the recognition that 
one's need for education never ceased. Even adults were treated as 
perpetual pupils. Brecht's pedagogy thus may be seen as a variation 
upon the familiar Enlightenment concept of immaturity, or nonage, a 
category that includes those not yet wise enough to act on their own 
account. The principle is preserved in today's legal distinction 
between minority and majority; that age at which young people can be 
trusted to vote for president and to drink hard liquor. Kant gave 
nonage its classical definition as "the lack of determination and 
courage to use one's intelligence without being guided by another" 
(Kant 132). Specifically, Kant meant the point at which a person 
could decide questions without the guidance of authority and thereby 
achieve an intellectual autonomy to match the civil freedoms claimed 
by Enlightenment political thought. 
The concept of gest differed from this classical principle on the 
question of the individual's autonomy from others' judgments. In 
Brecht's usage, maturity is demonstrated in the ability to follow 
others' judgments and to judge others in turn. This capacity might 
more properly be called sovereignty, since it summoned the recogni- 
tion of others, and involved a collective effort (the mutual education of 
actors by spectators and vice versa).5 The accession to sovereignty in 
the gestic theater depended not merely upon educating individuals to 
take responsible action in the social world as it existed (and even less, 
to occupy the legal and social position defined by civil society). 
Rather, sovereignty was demonstrated most decisively in changing 
the social world according to those exemplars of good and bad action 
defined in the gestic exchange. Gaining sovereignty entailed the 
development of one's society as well as oneself. 
It is on this count that Brecht's theory of gest can be appended to 
a dialectical tradition that began with Hegel and has been embellished 
by theorists of various disciplines in the last century and a half. But 
here the topic that I initially introduced as the modern problem of the 
subject can be called by its proper name: the problem of inter- 
subjectivity. The philosophical interest of Brecht's theory of gest lies 
in the intriguing context of its application; that is, at a conjuncture 
between experimental art and moral and political education. 
Stimulated by left-wing Weimar political culture, Brecht was trying to 
educate adults by treating them first as pupils, denying them recogni- 
tion of maturity, then offering them the delight of a new mastery over 
their social world. The philosophical issue raised by this model may 11
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be summarized in two closely related questions: Through what 
process of concrete interaction with others do individual subjects 
assume an identity? And, what practical limits does this collective 
process place upon the sovereignty of individuals in understanding 
and acting upon their world? 
One may return to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit to find a 
suitably dialectical analogy to Brecht's pedagogical scheme. Hegel 
believed that the autonomy of any individual in civil society rested 
upon a primeval event in the history of human consciousness.6 This 
event-the founding moment of all subsequent human societies- 
involved two consciousnesses, master and slave, in a struggle for 
recognition and dominance. In their struggle to the death, Hegel's 
master and slave achieve, paradoxically, the first human 
collaboration. Like Brecht's actor and spectator, the two con- 
sciousnesses of Hegel's primal drama depend upon each other to 
fulfill a function of which each is incapable alone. Both master and 
slave are hindered by a fundamental need that only the other can 
satisfy. 
In Hegel's account, it is the subject's need for objects that turns it 
to other subjects. Again we see a mediating term provide the hinge 
upon which intersubjectivity turns. The Hegelian self-consciousness 
emerges into the world only to discover that its desires cannot be 
gratified by the objects that exist in the world. Or, to re-phrase an 
aphorism of Brecht's, the smallest social unit is a threesome, two 
subjects and an object, two subjects and an image. In the 
Phenomenology the "raw" object cannot be assimilated to the 
subject's pleasure, or Genuss. To resolve this stand-off between itself 
and the object, self-consciousness looks to a third term, another self- 
consciousness that can transform raw objects into the objects of 
desire. Hence, as Hegel put it, the original self-consciousness 
"achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness" (116). 
In the confrontation that follows, each self-consciousness gains a 
measure of sovereignty and recognition through the other. The slave's 
labor is given direction and purpose by the master's will, which it 
obeys. The master's need is filled by the slave, who prepares and 
offers the world's objects for the despot's pleasure. In both cases, the 
relation of subject to object is mediated through another subject. In 
contrast to Kant's version of enlightenment, consciousness matures 
by recognizing its dependence on another consciousness. Mastery is 
conditioned by the existence of another who cannot merely be the 
object of mastery, but must participate in it. 12




The same sort of dependence characterizes the actor and 
spectator in Brecht's gestic scheme: one watches and criticizes that 
which the other offers in performance. In this case, however, the 
mediating term is an image, not an object. And it should be 
remembered that Brecht superimposed the relation of teacher and 
student onto that of actor and audience. This installs in the dramatic 
relation the same asymmetry that Hegel posits between master and 
slave. The success of the pedagogical theater hinged upon the 
spectator's admission that he or she had something to learn from the 
action on the stage. And, not surprisingly, the gestic method enjoyed 
its most fruitful applications in a theater where the players and 
audience were predominantly students and hence more likely to 
profess their intellectual nonage. Brecht's adult audiences were 
generally not so cooperative. 
The gestic method tried, however, to resolve the dependency and 
immaturity of the student-spectator. This distinguishes it from the 
Hegelian dialectic of master and slave. The gestic interaction resolved 
the asymmetric reciprocality of "master" and "slave" by offering the 
spectator the chance to assume the role of teacher-actor. With this 
came the opportunity to improve on the lesson that they had just been 
shown, to create a more accurate image of the real, and thus to demon- 
strate their mastery of the gest. In the pedagogic theater, learning 
involved the anticipation of mastery, but not-as with Hegel-a 
mastery over others. It is, rather, a mastery of the dramatic image. 
The dialectic of master and slave is the structural underpinning of the 
gestic relation. But since no subject ever occupies the master's 
position for long, mastery of one's actions is always provisional and 
must constantly be regained in the laboratory of the theater. 
The same structural question appears in another Hegelian ver- 
sion of the dialectic of sovereignty, Jacques Lacan's account of the 
mirror phase.' Lacan is primarily concerned with the effects of 
interhuman relations upon subjects in the earliest stages of 
development (from infancy to the years of the acquisition of 
language). In Lacan, then, we are dealing with yet another, more 
radical version of "nonage," the period of life prior to the moment 
when a young child can express itself and respond in speech to others. 
Yet, like Brecht, Lacan perceives a dialectic of sovereignty that is a 
process of self-recognition through others.. And Lacan also is 
fascinated with the structural roles that underlie the formation of 
social bonds and individual identity. In Lacan's description, this 
process is mediated by the world of signs and language, and moreover, 13
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the subject's identity itself is an effect of signs and images upon the 
subject. A discussion of Lacan at this point thus will redouble our 
theme of the mediating image and its anticipatory value for the actor- 
spectator. 
Lacan's comments on the mirror phase are of special interest to 
our topic here because in the mirror phase, as with the gestic theater, 
the observer's visual attention takes precedence over the operations of 
speech. Lacan attributes this to the visual precocity of the infant, 
because of which the infant's sensitivity to shapes outstrips its power 
to speak the language in which it is spoken to. The infant's attitude is 
not unlike that of Brecht and Laughton in their Galileo collaboration, 
where the gest could in effect supersede the spoken code and 
communicate an attitude chiefly by bodily actions and vocal inflec- 
tion. Likewise the infant's earliest interactions are dominated by its 
perception of human shapes (i.e., Gestalten, in particular the shape of 
the human face) and by its sensitivity to the rhythmic and tonal 
qualities of speech. Lacan argues that the infant's visual sensitivity is 
activated not only by others' shapes but also by the infant's own 
mirror image, which it comes to see as a distinct imago. The percep- 
the mirror is at odds with the 
infant's experience of its own body, which is characterized by tension 
and conflict. This discrepancy between a perceived self-image and an 
experience of inner turmoil is the first instance of that ambivalence in 
the subject's development that we shall speak of again shortly. 
Even in Lacan's version, this perception of self is realized in a 
theatrical interaction with others, specifically between the infant and 
its playmates. There, in the phenomena of transitivism, Lacan 
observes that the fascination with others' images contributes to a 
shifting and unstable sense of self. As Lacan says, "the child who 
strikes another says that he has been struck; the child who sees 
another fall, cries" (Ecrits[1977] 19). When children six to eighteen 
months old confront each other, they play games of tag and mimicry 
that allow them to practice mastery over their own bodies by imputing 
that mastery to others of the same age. In Lacan's words, they engage 
in "those gestures of fictitious actions by which a subject reconducts 
the imperfect effort of the other's gesture by confusing their distinct 
application . . ." (18). In the images of others, the child perceives and 
anticipates a command of its body that it does not yet possess; hence 
the "jubilation" that accompanies this perception. At the same time it 
attributes (mistakenly) a superior self-control to its nursery rivals. 14




The myriad identifications of the mirror phase-the child's playful 
attitude toward the mirror and the games of mimicry and aggression 
that it plays with its similars-give rise to an unbalanced reciprocality 
that Lacan calls an "alienating identity." 
Lacan accounts for this alienation by referring to the radical 
dependency of the human infant upon those who care for it. This 
dependency installs into human experience a reliance upon others for 
the recognition of one's own selfhood. It is demonstrated both in the 
infant's games with its similars (its mirror-images) and in the 
influence of parents and other adults, who give the child its name. 
Indeed, the child's first encounters with its mirror image may well be 
accompanied by an adult's assertion, "That's you!" The child's initial 
experience of a self is bound up with the images and authority of 
others: 
The first effect of the imago on the human being is an effect of the 
alienation of the subject. It is in the other that the subject 
identifies with himself and even first experiences himself. A 
phenomenon that will seem less surprising if one recalls the 
fundamental, social conditions of the human Urnwelt-and if one 
invokes the intuition that dominates all of Hegel's specula- 
tion. 
Human desire is constituted, he tells us, under the sign of 
mediation; it is a desire to have one's desire recognized. It has as 
its object a desire, that of others, in the sense that man has no 
object constituted for his desire without some mediation, as can 
be seen in his most primitive needs in the fact that even his 
feeding must be prepared and provided. (Ecrits [19661 181) 
In this characteristically playful and inventive revision of Hegel's 
terms, Lacan substitutes the helpless infant for Hegel's master, an 
equation justified by their absolute dependence upon the labor of 
others to satisfy their desires.' Ironically, this utter helplessness gives 
the infant a control over the actions and desires of others-a control 
whose despotism can be appreciated only by the parents of a newborn 
infant. The infant's dependency is never entirely overcome in the 
subsequent phases of development, even through the acquisition of 
language. The ensuing "entry into the symbolic," as Lacan terms 
learning to speak, merely shifts the subject's dependency on and 
domination by others, since the poor child must then assume someone 15
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else's name and learn someone else's language to express his or her 
own desires. 
The alienating identity of the mirror phase is recapitulated in 
various dual relations in adult experience, among which Lacan names 
both the master-slave relation of Hegel and actor-spectator of the 
theater. What we have seen as the gestic exchange, then, is condi- 
tioned by an original interaction of subject and image in the playroom 
theatrics of young children. And what we have termed the dramatic 
image of Brecht's gestic theater is a specific form of that imago 
installed as the first instance of our identity. Yet all these dual rela- 
tions are burdened with ambivalent identifications between inferior 
dnd superior terms. In his essay on aggression, for example, Lacan 
makes this comparison: "Similarly, it is by means of an identification 
with the other that [the child] sees the whole gamut of reactions of 
bearing and display, whose structural ambivalence is clearly revealed 
in his behaviour, the slave being identified with the despot, the actor 
with the spectator, the seduced with the seducer" (Ecrits[1977] 19). 
Not only does each of these relations recall the confusion of self and 
other in the mirror stage, but each recapitulates that "alienating 
identity" that Lacan holds to be the essence of human identity. By the 
same token, whether in the theater or in the sexual drama of seduc- 
tion, we reenact the dualism of our antics before the mirror and of 
those mock battles in the nursery. 
But there is no hint in Lacan's writings that these relations are 
reversible and hence anticipate an even-handed and egalitarian social 
relation. From the example of Brecht's gestic theater, we might well 
argue that the relations of sexual aggressiveness hold the promise of a 
playful exchange between seducer and seduced. And, iri fact, Freud 
noted that certain perversions-in particular, sadism and 
voyeurism-allow partners to alternate between active and passive 
roles (Freud 14: 132). Brecht also believed the effectiveness of 
theater could be increased when the audience expected to assume the 
role of actor, and when actors were trained in watching themselves 
and others. If the relation of teacher and student is added to Lacan's 
catalogue of structural ambivalence, then the reversibility of these 
relations of dominance becomes something of a desirable norm rather 
than a pathological exception. The ambivalence of the mirror phase 
might also yield a concept of genuinely shared, but always provi- 
sional mastery that promises every subject the opportunity to assume 16




the structural positions of actor and spectator, teacher and student, 
seducer and seduced. 
The sovereignty engendered by this dialectic need not reinstate 
the transcendental premises against which Lacan struggled so fiercely 
in his writings. It does depend, however, on a concept of collective or 
shared sovereignty of the sort that Lacan never asserted. In Lacan's 
view, the subject continues to be dominated by the "signifier" even 
after learning to speak and passing through the Oedipal trauma into 
later childhood. Thus, speech does not introduce the person into a 
condition of autonomy and free reciprocality, but continues to hold 
subjects in dependence upon the world of discourse which preexists 
any individual speaker. Lacan's commentators have sometimes ques- 
tioned this persistent fascination with the structural integrity of cul- 
ture and social relations, at the expense of the individual subject's 
participatory role in culture. John Brenkman has argued that, just as 
the mirror phase anticipates the bodily maturity of the young child, the 
acquisition of language "installs within experience a utopian expecta- 
tion of self-developing interactions in which the individual's auton- 
omy lies in participation not in an imaginary self-sufficience. . . ." In 
other words, the speech situation contains a utopian promise: that 
subjects might participate freely and reciprocally in interactions with 
others, and that this participation be expanded to all domains of 
human life. 
The (largely obstructed) utopian expectation of self-developing 
interactions does not eliminate the structural asymmetry of humans' 
relations to others. This asymmetry is the ineradicable result of our 
each having been a helpless infant, entirely dependent on others for 
our sustenance and education. Hence, the development of sovereignty 
will always be a dialectic, some version of the structural conflict 
between master and slave. Sovereignty will always struggle against 
the contradictory limits placed on it by our human experience: a 
continued dependence (even as adults) on others, coupled with the 
"imaginary" wish to be entirely whole and self-sufficient. Yet even 
Lacan's version of the dialectic of sovereignty may be directed, as 
Brenkman demonstrates, toward political questions. This does not 
mean that politics, or a political theater, may liberate humans from the 
trials of infancy and childhood. Politics may, however, promise 
emancipation from the particular, historical forms which constrain 
human interaction. Brecht's assault upon the traditional theater ought 17
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to be understood in this context: as an attempt to challenge the 
particular constraints upon the interaction of actors and audience. In 
its place Brecht proposed, among other things, a dramatic version of 
what Brenkman calls "self- activity in language." It is this self-activity 
that instates within our daily experience a lived alternative to the often 
autocratic, authoritarian, and paternalistic structure of existing 
institutions. 
Brecht's prescience lay in grasping the dialectic of sovereignty as 
a problem of political and aesthetic education. As we have seen, 
Hegel considered the role of this dialectic in establishing the social 
relations of civil society: behind every mature citizen lay the primeval 
struggle between master and slave. Lacan examines the dialectic as a 
process which transforms the inarticulate infant into a speaking 
participant in the community's symbolic life. In his pedagogic 
theories, Brecht's interest was how the gestic theater could foster the 
intellectual sovereignty of its members and so enhance their ability to 
act in history. Despite their differences, Fredric Jameson has sug- 
gested a fertile analogy between the Marxist terms of Brecht's project 
and the Lacanian categories of imaginary and symbolic: 
That it is not simply a question of method or theory but has 
implications for aesthetic production may be suggested by the 
example of Brecht, whose conception of an anti-Aristotelian 
theater, an aesthetic which refuses spectator empathy and 
"identification" has raised problems that are clarified by our 
present context: we would suggest, indeed, that the Brechtean 
attack on "culinary" theater-as well as the apparent paradoxes 
to which the ideal of "epic theater" gives rise-can best be 
understood as an attempt to block Imaginary investment and 
thereby to dramatize the problematical relationship between the 
observing subject and the Symbolic Order or history. (380-81) 
Specifically, Brecht wanted to create a subject who could be at once a 
critical observer of history and a participant in that same historical 
process. The gestic theater addressed this problem by re- 
orchestrating the play of identifications between actor and spectator, 
although not by blocking identification altogether, as Jameson says. 
The spectator saw the gests of daily life translated on the stage into fic- 
tive images. At the same time, the spectator was expected to enact just 
these fictions (or similar ones) as soon as the audience was released 18




from the theater onto the stage of historical actions. By making gests, 
or actions, as "intentionalizable" as words, the gestic theater sought 
to make a language of action and to teach its basic alphabet. 
The exit from the gestic theater marked the audience's "second 
entry into history," to paraphrase Lacan. Brecht wanted his 
audiences to emerge from the theater as subjects of historical action, 
not the objects of that action. If before they had seen history as an 
invisible drama directed by politicians and generals, Brecht hoped 
they would now understand that their lives were history as well.9 
Having judged the fictive actions of the theater, the audience might 
enter the field of historical action with a different experience of their 
roles there. By successfully reversing the poles of actor and spectator, 
they could act the gest that made history, even if it were a gest so 
evidently trivial as learning one's alphabet (an example in the 
Brechtian play most obviously derived from the gestic theater, The 
Mother). The act itself might not have changed so much as the 
subject's experience of it: learning to read might now be felt as an ac- 
tion of the same historical magnitude as leading a military campaign. 
If it had succeeded, the gestic theater would have made of history a 
dramatic language that everyone could speak, a drama in which 
everyone had a role. 
Brecht's intention required that a perpetual tension be 
maintained between acts of reflection and reflective action. His own 
comments show that he was attempting to erase that original sin of all 
class societies, the division between mental and manual labor, 
between thinking and doing: 
There is no difference between the true philosophy and true 
politics. On the heels of this realization follows the thinker's 
suggestion to educate young people by acting in the theater; that 
is, by making them at once doers and observers, as it is prescribed 
in the pedagogies. The pleasure in observation alone is harmful to 
the state, as is the pleasure in deeds alone. In carrying out deeds 
that are exposed to their own observation, young people are 
educated for the state. ( Werke 17: 1023) 
The somewhat Leninist cast to this observation should not obscure its 
utopian statement. To engage fully in the collective life of the com- 
munity-perhaps a more fortuitous term than "the state"-young 
people must engage in the collective enterprise of mutual observation 19
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and shared action. The theater offered a site upon which their ability 
to act freely and think critically was developed and rehearsed. But the 
real test of the gestic theater was whether these gests could be 
emulated in history, whether this theater was a school for life. It was in 
this transfer from the imaginary to the historical that the pedagogic 
theater proved its usefulness-or its danger-to the state. 
That Brecht did not succeed in abolishing the division between 
mental and manual labor need hardly be said. The notes on pedagogy 
outline a utopian design: it foresaw that the accession to sovereignty 
might coincide with the formation of political consciousness and a 
readiness to take political action. Yet the vehicle of this process was a 
dramatic practice that had to survive in existing cultural institutions. 
Consequently, the success of Brecht's political aims was contingent 
upon the readiness of great numbers of people-actors, directors, 
financial backers, set designers-to share in his aims. The theory of 
gest and the pedagogic theater flowered during that brief period in 
Brecht's career when he possessed the necessary raw materials for his 
project: a willing group of actors, access to theaters, a politically- 
minded audience, and (perhaps most important) a volatile historical 
moment in which radical change appeared imminent. The short life of 
this combination was to have subsequent and substantial effects on 
the nature of Brecht's theorizing and his theater. Even so, the theory of 
gest remains an intriguing fragment in Brecht's dramatic theory and, 
in the context provided here, a provocative formulation of the problem 
of human inter-subjectivity. 
NOTES 
1. For brief descriptions of this phase in Brecht's career, see Volker 144-51 and 
Willett 188-90, 206-08. 
2. The formulation is borrowed from Jameson, who is concerned with the confronta- 
tion between a theory of society (Marxism) and a theory of the psyche 
(psychoanalysis). This produces "the difficulty of providing mediations between social 
phenomena and what must be called private, rather than merely individual, facts" 
(338). Psychoanalysis poses the question of the subject-those "private" facts of 
interiority-in such a way that Brecht and other Marxist thinkers may be reevaluated in 20




terms that are not always generic to the Marxist tradition. Such a reevaluation is 
undertaken in the analysis that follows. 
3. Brecht may have adapted the term from his musical collaborator, Kurt Weill, who 
used the term to describe the gestic or demonstrative qualities of music (see Weill). 
Brecht usually applied "alienation" to professional acting, as a particular means of 
presenting or exposing a role to the audience, and to methods of staging the dramatic 
narrative. "Gest," on the other hand, described common, everyday actions, whether 
acted on the stage or outside the theater. Brecht's usage of "gest" dates from his work in 
the didactic theater at Baden-Baden and in Berlin, in the years 1929-33; his first 
systematic application of "alienation" came several years later, after his trip to 
Moscow in 1935. 
4. For a strictly linguistic analysis of this reciprocality, see Benveniste's essay 
"Subjectivity in Language" (223-30). 
5. The term is adapted from the context of political philosophy, which has tradi- 
tionally attributed sovereignty to a monarch, a state, or the "body politic." In this tradi- 
tion, sovereignty has usually required the recognition of others: the monarch must be 
recognized as monarch by his subjects, or the sovereign state must be recognized by 
other states (see Benn). 
6. Hegel gives this construction to the master-slave struggle in his lecture notes to the 
Philosophy of Mind. There he argues that the struggle for recognition "can only occur 
in the natural state, where men exist only as single, separate individuals; but it is absent 
in civil society and the State because here the recognition for which the combatants 
fought already exists." Cited in Norman 51. 
7. Lacan's most extended explication of the mirror phase is contained in the early 
essays "The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I" and "Aggressivity in 
Psychoanalysis" (Ecrits 1-29). Useful analyses include Laplanche and Pontalis 249- 
50, Wilden, Lemaire 79-81, and Jameson. 
8. Freud links this to the prematurity of human birth, relative to other animals: the 
human infant's "intra-uterine existence seems to be short in comparison with that of 
most animals, and it is sent into the world in a less finished state. As a result, the 
influence of the real external world upon it is intensified.. . . Moreover, the dangers of 
the external world have a greater importance for it, so that the value of the object [i.e., 
the mother] which can alone protect it against them and take the place of its former 
intra-uterine life is enormously enhanced" (Freud 20: 154-55; cited Laplanche and 
Pontalis 190). 
9. This is, I might add, the gest's contribution to Brecht's later "alienation effect." 
The gestic theater was supposed to deconstruct ordinary events into their gestic 
components and to present these components in the language of daily life: this way of 
buying an elephant, that way of washing one's face. The alienation effect performed a 
similar decomposition upon the events of history and the narrative plot of the play 
itself. 21
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